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ABSTRACT: Keith DeRose and Stewart Cohen object  to the fallibilist  strand of pragmatic
invariantism regarding knowledge ascriptions that it is committed to non-cancelable pragmatic
implications. I show that this objection points us to an asymmetry about which aspects of the
conveyed content of knowledge ascriptions can be canceled: we can cancel those aspects that
ascribe a lesser epistemic standing to the subject but not those that ascribe a better or perfect
epistemic  standing.  This  situation  supports  the  infallibilist  strand of  pragmatic  invariantism
according to which knowledge semantically requires absolute certainty but this claim is often
pragmatically weakened: it turns out that exactly those aspects of the conveyed content are
cancelable that this view claims are pragmatic. I also argue that attributor contextualism and
relativism do not have an alternative explanation of this phenomenon.
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A major point of discussions in the recent debate about knowledge ascriptions has been to what extent
our intuitions about their felicity may be due to pragmatic implications. I take the main positions in the
debate to be the following:
Attributor Contextualism: The semantic truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions depend on
the  context  in  which  the  knowledge ascription  is  uttered  (the  speaker’s  context)  and these
account for the vast majority of our intuitions.
Relativism: The semantic truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions depend on the context of
assessment (the “intuiter’s” context) and this explains our intuitions.
1 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Synthese. The final authenticated version is
available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02663-7 
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Fallibilist Pragmatic Invariantism (FPI): The semantic truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions
are invariant and require a fallibilist standard of justification that is often met by us. In contexts
with high standards (including skeptical contexts)  pragmatic strengthening leads to intuitions
that many knowledge ascriptions are false, although semantically they still are true.
Infallibilist Pragmatic Invariantism (IPI): Knowledge ascriptions semantically require absolute
certainty  to  count  as  semantically  true.  In  most  contexts  this  requirement  is  pragmatically
weakened which explains why we often intuitively take many knowledge ascriptions to be true.2
In this paper, I argue that data on cancelability supports IPI. In particular, there is an asymmetry in
which aspects of the conveyed content can be canceled: we cannot cancel the implication that the
subject (the “knower”) is in a position of high or absolute certainty, but we can cancel the implication
that she is in an imperfect epistemic state. The former is a well-known problem for FPI due to Keith
DeRose (1998) and Stewart Cohen (1999), but the latter, and in particular the arising asymmetry have
not been discussed at great length. I argue this asymmetry is also problematic for contextualism and
relativism insofar as they lack a convincing explanation of it. Their best attempt of such an explanation
is to appeal to some form of a Lewisian “rule of attention”, but I will argue that this attempt fails.
 
Let  me  begin  by  revisiting  the  problem for  FPI  which  will  help  to  make the  asymmetry  clearer.
Fallibilist pragmatic invariantists such as Jessica  Brown (2006), Patrick Rysiew (2007), Geoff Pynn
(2015), and Alexander Dinges (2019) claim that knowledge ascriptions are semantically true under
conditions that require only a reasonably good epistemic standing of the subject (plus, of course, the
truth of the embedded proposition). While this is in accordance with most everyday uses of knowledge
2 FPI is often referred to as “moderate pragmatic invariantism” (and Pynn (2015) calls it “pragmatic contextualism”)
whereas IPI is often called “skeptical pragmatic invariantism” or “strict pragmatic invariantism”.  I use this terminology
because I do not believe that IPI is committed to a serious version of skepticism.
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ascriptions, in some contexts we seem to require more than that of a subject to count as knowing. In
particular it seems that we don’t allow anyone to know anything about the external world in “skeptical
contexts”, i.e. contexts like a philosophical discussion about Descartes’s Meditations. Champions of
FPI argue that this is because when used in such a context knowledge ascriptions are pragmatically
strengthened so that they pragmatically imply that the subject is in a perfect epistemic standing – a
standing that she could in fact not be in. The idea often is that if the speaker was taken to assert simply
the semantic content of the knowledge ascription, she would be claiming something irrelevant, and
therefore participants of the conversation interpret the utterance as a stronger claim.3 Thus FPI ends up
making very similar claims as contextualists about the conveyed content but maintain invariable and
achievable truth conditions at the semantic level.
A problem for this account is that the pragmatic strengthening FPI claims lacks a feature typically
associated with pragmatic implication: they are not  explictly cancelable (DeRose 1998, sec. 10-11;
Cohen 1999, 60). To explicitly cancel a pragmatic implication P is to add something like “but I do not
mean to say that P” to a statement that carries a pragmatic implication that P without making the
statement infelicitous. For example, I can say “There is a gas station around the corner, but I do not
mean to say that they sell petrol”, whereas it is infelicitous to say “There is a gas station around the
corner, but I do not mean to say that it is around the corner.” However, whenever we try to cancel what
FPI claims is a pragmatic implication of a knowledge ascription with respect to the subject’s epistemic
standing, we give rise to a so-called “concessive knowledge attribution” (CKAs). For example, imagine
a skeptical context in which I try to make the following statement: “I know that I have hands, but I do
not mean to say that I can rule out all possible errors.” Rather than canceling a pragmatic implication,
3 More recently, Mikkel Gerken (2017) and Alexander Dinges (2018) have also at least partly appealed to biases  that
leads us to overrate the probability or relevance of skeptical scenarios.
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this utterance appears to be a contradiction.4 Even worse, this appears to be a feature of concessive
knowledge attributions in general (the best motivation of this is in Lewis 1996). But if CKAs appear
contradictory, this means they fail to directly cancel the pragmatic implication – rather the apparent
contradiction  will  even  call  into  question  the  semantic  content.  Thus  FPI  must  claim  pragmatic
implications that are not explicitly cancelable.
An initial response to this problem might be to point out that CKAs can sometimes be felicitous. For
example, we may say:
CKA1: “I know they’re going to lose, but I’m going going to  carry on watching just in
case.”
CKA2: “I know the opera starts at 8, but I don’t mean to say that I can rule out being
deceived by an evil demon.”5
Dylan  Dodd (2010,  390-3)  and Trent  Dougherty  and Patrick  Rysiew (2009;  2011,  400-2)  discuss
examples like CKA1 at some length. Dodd plausibly argues that CKA1 amounts to asserting something
along the lines of “There is no chance they are not going to lose, but there is a small chance they are
not going to lose.” Yet CKA1 is felicitous, because the speaker is not committed to the truth of this
statement – the first half of CKA1 is uttered as a hyperbole, or an expression of frustration. Similarly,
CKA2 can be felicitous in a low-stakes context, because the speaker appears to be clarifying what
4 Brown (2006, 428) denies that the supposed pragmatic implications are not cancelable. She argues that it is felicitous to
say “S knows that p, but her belief wouldn’t match the facts in a really distant possible world.” This seems right, but I
would respond that once we make explicit that we mean an epistemically possible world and explain what this means
we involve ourselves in the same apparent contradiction as above (although the utterance may still be felicitous). On the
other hand, if we do not explain what we mean, we will actually fail to cancel the pragmatic implication in question. I
should also flag that I think this talk of “distance” of possible worlds is problematic, especially as skeptical scenarios
resemble the actual world as far as our experience is concerned.
5 CKA1 is originally from Hawthorne (2004, 21, fn. 60) and is credited to Tamar Gendler and Brian Weatherson there.
CKA2 was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
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information she is trying to convey – namely, that they are sufficiently well-informed, but may not be
prepared to defend their  information against  a radical  skeptic.  However,  once we ask whether  the
speaker  really  knows that  the  opera  starts  at  8,  it  appears  that  she  is  asserting  a  similar  type  of
contradiction:  even in  the low-stakes  context,  the  speaker  appears  to  be expressing  that  it  is  both
impossible and possible that the opera does not start at 8.
Another attempt of objecting to  the problem for FPI raised above might be that there plausibly are
pragmatic implications that are not explicitly cancelable. But is this true? Paul Grice (1989, 44) thought
that at least all conversational implicatures are explicitly cancelable. Even more, it may seem that all
pragmatic implications (not just implicatures) are in fact cancelable as they are “defeasible inferences”
just like conversational implicatures (Dimmock and Huvenes 2014, 3249). If this is so, the pragmatic
implications claimed by FPI could not exist. However, some (Weiner 2006, Rett 2015, Åkerman 2015)
have tried to provide cases of conversational implicatures that are not explicitly cancelable. These cases
rely on the fact that the cancellation will be subject to pragmatic alteration due to its obvious falsity
(which will often make the speaker sound ironical). The challenge here is to find a way of making the
speaker’s claim credible so that the pragmatic effects of the cancellation vanish. This may only be
possible given the right setup of the conversation – in such a case, the pragmatic implications arguably
remain contextually cancelable, i.e. they would be cancelable given the right context, but they would
not be explicitly cancelable in their original context (see Blome-Tillmann 2008,  Åkerman 2015). The
following modification of one of Matthew Weiner’s (2006) original cases by Michael Blome-Tillmann
(2008, 159) illustrates this:
Unbeknownst to Alice, who is sprawling over several seats on the recreation deck, Sarah
and one of her engineering officers are testing a portable tractor beam. For the purposes at
issue, the tractor beam has to be strong enough to make it impossible for Alice to make
room for someone else to sit down next to her. After activating the beam Sarah asks Alice
via the intercom:
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Sarah: Alice, I’m curious as to whether it would be physically possible for you to make
room for someone else to sit down.
Alice: (baffled) Why should I? There’s nobody else here who wants to sit down. [...]
Sarah: Oh, I’m sorry. I didn’t mean to imply that you should make room. We are testing a
new tractor beam on you and we are curious as to whether you can do it. This would give
us an important indication as to how strong the beam really is.
Sarah’s initial statement gives rise to the implicature that Sarah thinks that Alice should make room
(and Sarah would be conveying this in an ironical way). In most contexts, any attempt to cancel this
implicature would only add to the irony. However, in this specific context, Alice is able to cancel the
implicature.
Weiner’s cases may be challenged further, as they seem to be relying on the  practical difficulty of
making the attempted cancellation credible to the hearer. However, for the sake of the argument, let us
assume that there are cases of conversational implicatures that are not explicitly cancelable in certain
contexts. Even then, it seems that FPI has trouble explaining the oddness of CKAs. First, the kind of
exceptions that have been pointed out in the debate surrounding the cancelability test are very different
from the ones FPI needs to rely on. The problem in these cases is to make the cancellation seem
genuine and credible, and this explains why the cancellation fails – but it is easy for a speaker to
convince us that they cannot rule out all possible errors without sounding ironical, so CKAs seem very
different from those cases (cf. Dimmock and Huvenes 2014, 3250). Second, it seems that CKAs always
appear contradictory. But given our discussion above, if FPI is correct, there should at least be some
contexts in which they appear consistent. Third, advocates of FPI face the problem of explaining the
contradictory appearance of CKAs in general, combined with the fact that strengthening the conveyed
content  of  a  knowledge ascription  by  way of  claiming the  stronger  claim to  be  an implication  is
felicitous – I can say “S knows that P, and by this I mean that she can rule out all possible errors.” The
problem of explaining this asymmetry will be discussed at greater length below.
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But first, let us get a better view of that asymmetry itself. To do so, let us look at why this problem does
not apply to IPI. IPI traces back to ideas of Peter Unger (1975) and Jonathan Schaffer (2004) and is
championed by Herman Cappelen (2005), Earl Conee (2005), Wayne Davis (2007) and Igor Douven
(2007). The claim is that knowledge ascriptions semantically express that the subject is in an ideal
epistemic state with respect to the embedded proposition, i.e. she can rule out all possibilities of error.
Of course, this is rarely the case, so outside of skeptical contexts this statement will be pragmatically
weakened so that it expresses something fit to the purposes of the conversation. For example, if the
question  is  whether  we have  to  go  to  the  bank today,  my saying “I  know that  the  bank is  open
tomorrow” expresses that I am certain enough about this to base our decision on it, but not that I can
rule out deception by an evil demon (which I obviously cannot). Because of how rare skeptical contexts
are,  this  pragmatic  weakening  occurs  by  default;  these are  what  Grice  would  call  generalized
conversational implicatures. The implicatures in play here can be canceled, for I can say: “I know that
the bank is open tomorrow, and by this I mean that I am absolutely certain – there is not even a remote
possibility of error.” While such a statement is presumptuous, it does not seem to involve any kind of
contradiction as CKAs do. We can also add less presumptuous statements of the form “… and by this I
mean that I can even rule out that P” which do not itself make a claim of infallibility but do lead to a
stronger statement being conveyed.6
6 One feature of most generalized conversational implicatures is that we can cancel them in an attempt to appear witty.
For example, we can say humorously: “Jones has three children. In fact, she even has four of them.” This does not seem
to be the case with the implicatures discussed here.  The reason for  this  appears  to be related to the fact  that  the
pragmatic effects in question represent a weakening of the semantic meaning (whereas in the children example, the
semantic meaning is strengthened, so that the original statement implicated that Jones has exactly three children). Given
we  are  dealing  with  weakening,  we  cannot  “fool”  the  listener  into  thinking  something  that  we  did  not  actually
semantically entail. An apt comparison to the implicatures we are dealing with are domain restrictions. For example, we
can say: “Smith always brushes his teeth. And by this I mean that he brushes his teeth all day and night.” This may be
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The  situation  then  is  this:  given  any  knowledge  ascription,  the  speaker  can  add  a  statement  that
strengthens  the  conveyed  content  up  until  the  point  of  ascribing  infallibility  with  respect  to  the
embedded proposition to the subject. However, the converse is not the case: it is infelicitous to add a
statement to a knowledge ascription that is intended to weaken the conveyed content so that a lesser
epistemic standing would be required of the subject to confirm the conveyed content. And this is why
any pragmatic strengthening of knowledge ascriptions with respect to the subject’s epistemic standing
which we could claim would not be cancelable7 whereas any pragmatic weakening of them would be.
So far we have seen that this is a problem for FPI that does not apply to IPI. But I suggest that we ask a
further  question:  what  explains this  feature  of  knowledge ascriptions?  Why can  we add claims  to
knowledge ascriptions that strengthen the conveyed content but cannot do the same with claims that are
intended to weaken the conveyed content? IPI has an obvious explanation of this: it is because the
former cancel pragmatic implications (which are always, or almost always, cancelable) whereas the
latter  are  attempts  to  cancel  semantic  implications  while  also  drawing  attention  to  the  semantic
meaning, which gives rise to a contradiction. It is also clear that other theories cannot make use of this
explanation as they deny that this is the case. FPI is furthest from the explanation that IPI offers as it
involves the claim that pragmatic and semantic implications are often divided up conversely to how IPI
claims they are – the more so the weaker the claimed semantic meaning of knowledge ascription is.
funny, but only in the same way that it is funny to say “I know that the Queen is British. And by this I mean that I can
rule out that my brain is being manipulated by aliens to think that the Queen is British.” (Thanks to an anonymous
reviewer for raising this point.)
7 There are uncontroversial cases of pragmatic strengthening of knowledge ascriptions that do not apply to the subject’s
epistemic standing. For example, if I am asked whether I locked my door I could reply “I know that there is a lot of
crime in my neighborhood”, giving rise to a conversational implicature that I did indeed lock my door.
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But what about attributor contextualism and relativism? Can they offer alternative explanations of this
asymmetry? Contextualists such as Keith DeRose (1998), Stewart Cohen (1999), David Lewis (1996)
and  more  recently  Michael  Blome-Tillmann  (2014),  Zoltán  Gendler  Szabó  and  Jonathan  Schaffer
(2014) and Jonathan Ichikawa (2017) think that the semantic truth conditions vary with the context of
attribution and  that  these  determine  the  epistemic  standing  that  is  ascribed  to  the  subject  by  the
knowledge ascription. Relativists such as John MacFarlane (2005) make a similar claim except that
they think that it is the context of assessment which has this effect. Pragmatic effects on both views do
not, or only to a less significant degree, alter which epistemic standing is ascribed to the subject by the
conveyed content.  If the ascription of an epistemic standing is conveyed in virtue of the semantic
meaning, this means that the semantic implications of knowledge ascriptions are cancelable, but only in
one direction. That semantic implications can be cancelable is a controversial claim in itself, but I will
here  assume that  this  can  be  the  case  (see  Davies  2017 for  some discussion).  Contextualists  and
relativists thus need to identify a feature of knowledge ascriptions that accounts for the cancelability of
those implications that involve the claim that the subject is in a weaker or less-than-perfect epistemic
state which does not lead to the prediction that implications of the subject being in a stronger or perfect
epistemic state should also be cancelable.
The best candidate for such a feature appears to be some version of David Lewis’s (1996, see Gerken
2017, 24-30 for a discussion of relevant evidence) “rule of attention”. Lewis champions a relevant
alternatives theory according to which a subject needs to be able to rule out all relevant possibilities
that entail non-P in order to count as knowing that P. He spells out the notion of relevance by giving a
tentative list of rules including the “rule of attention”. According to this rule, a possibility is always
relevant if speakers in the context of attribution are currently attending to it. Note that this rule has a
sister  rule  applicable  to  relativism according  to  which  attention  by  the  subjects  in  the  context  of
assessment  leads  to  relevance.  Lewis  points out  that  this  rule  explains the infelicity  of concessive
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knowledge attributions: by mentioning the fact that there are uneliminated possibilities, or by even
pointing  out  certain  possibilities,  we  draw  attention  to  possibilities  and  make  these  possibilities
relevant. This, in turn, leads to the knowledge ascription actually being false, even though it might have
been true had we not drawn attention to these possibilities. 
Similarly the contextualist or relativist can claim that attempts to cancel a semantic implication of a
subject being in a perfect or very good epistemic standing defy their own purpose by drawing attention
(in the context of attribution or in the context of assessment) to possibilities the subject is (or may be)
unable to eliminate. Such attempts will only make the statement more clearly false as it guarantees that
these possibilities are being attended to.  However,  there is  no such problem in canceling semantic
implications  of  the  subject  being  in  a  comparatively weak or  less-than-perfect  epistemic  standing.
These are guaranteed to work precisely because they point to potentially uneliminated possibilities of
error making them immediately relevant.
The “rule of attention” thus would be precisely the kind of feature contextualists and relativists are
looking for. However, it is implausible that knowledge ascriptions really have this feature. As, among
others,  Michael  Williams  (2004)  and  Michael  Blome-Tillmann  (2014,  19-20)  observe,  the  rule  of
attention makes it too easy to raise the standards of knowledge. Blome-Tillmann considers an example
where one sees one’s teenage son sneaking out of the house at night and tells him the next morning “I
know you left the house yesterday.” The son then objects that one may also just have dreamed this. If
the rule of attention is correct, that should then create a context in which it is false that one knows that
the son sneaked out. But it is implausible that the mere mentioning of a remote possibility can serve as
the son’s defense here – in Lewis’s terminology, one  should intuitively still be allowed to “properly
ignore” this possibility.8 Thus the rule of attention, as it stands, is not a plausible feature of knowledge
8 DeRose (2004) suggests that such cases may lead to “gappy” semantics: contextualists may say that semantic evaluation
of  knowledge  ascriptions  depends  on  an  agreed-upon  “scoreboard”,  so  if  two  speakers  fail  to  agree  on  such  a
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ascription  and  therefore  cannot  explain  the  asymmetry  of  which  aspects  of  their  meaning  are
cancelable.
Can we fix the “rule of attention”? Maybe mere attention is not enough to make a possibility become
relevant – perhaps we need a notion of “warranted attention”. But if this is the case, we no longer have
a feature that explains why any attempt to weaken the conveyed content of a knowledge ascription is
infelicitous. For example, it still seems wrong to tell one’s son “I know you left the house yesterday,
but I cannot rule out I just dreamed this.” Maybe the speaker herself needs to embrace the possibility in
some way. But then it seems that two speakers within the same conversation can have different truth
conditions for their knowledge ascriptions which seems independently implausible. Maybe attending to
an uneliminated possibility can make a knowledge ascription seem problematic in some way without
making it false. But this seems to fly in the face of the contextualist or relativist strategy as it introduces
an important non-semantic feature governing our judgments of felicity. Distinguishing semantic and
non-semantic features governing those judgments in this way would also seem ad hoc as there is no
indication that these judgments are caused in different ways.9
scoreboard their utterances will not be assigned a truth value. But this position has serious drawbacks as well. First, we
need to accept that there can easily be situations which defy semantic evaluation because of speaker disagreement.
Second,  the  parent  in  this  example  will  likely not  be persuaded that  neither  of  them is  right,  so we still  lack  an
explanation of our intuitions about knowledge ascriptions and their truth.
9 It is worth mentioning that IPI can give an unproblematic account of these examples precisely because it treats the
contextual variations as pragmatic. According to IPI, the father’s assertion was semantically false even before the son
raised an error possibility, and this semantic evaluation does not change. However, the statement’s pragmatic meaning
was true because in the original  context remote possibilities  were irrelevant to its  evaluation. IPI is  able to use a
modified rule of  attention to explain how the raising of  error  possibilities  can  sometimes lead to  a  change in  the
pragmatic meaning of knowledge ascriptions. However, it has no problem saying that it depends on further features of
the context whether this move is successful – and that the son’s reply is a case where the pragmatic meaning does not
change. That is because this  pragmatic rule of (warranted) attention is not part of IPI’s account of the asymmetry
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Are there alternative strategies for an explanation of the asymmetry? I am not aware of any other
resources, but one might well  take up the task of finding one.  In general,  what contextualists  and
relativists need is a feature that privileges the infallibilist perspective so that walking away from it will
be infelicitous whereas walking towards it is fine. However, it seems that the problems of the “rule of
attention” generalize: if it is held that the attempted cancellation can change the truth conditions of the
knowledge ascription itself (as it is without the cancellation), then it seems to become too easy to raise
the standards of knowledge, at least insofar as this feature can either be exploited to betray the purpose
of the conversation or is not applicable widely enough to do all the explanatory work. If this feature
does not affect the truth conditions, we are moving away from contextualism or relativism respectively
and owe an explanation why this exception of the strategy of accounting for judgments of felicity
through semantic truth conditions is warranted. I do not take these to be decisive considerations why
such a feature could not exist but rather reasons why we, in the absence of a convincing proposal, can
legitimately assume that it does not. If that is so, contextualism and relativism lack an explanation of
the asymmetry regarding which aspects of the conveyed content of a knowledge ascription can be
canceled.
So to sum up, there is  an asymmetry with respect  to  which aspects of the conveyed content  of a
knowledge  ascription  regarding  the  subject’s  epistemic  standing  can  be  canceled.  IPI  has  a
straightforward explanation of this phenomenon: as is typically the case, we can cancel the pragmatic
aspects but not the semantic ones. FPI is committed to the problematic claim that the semantic aspects
can be canceled but at least some of the pragmatic aspects cannot. Contextualists and relativists are not
committed to non-cancelable pragmatic aspects, but they lack an explanation why a certain group of the
semantic aspects of meaning is cancelable but another one is not. It also seems that there are general
regarding cancelability.
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obstacles to providing such an explanation. While there are of course many other important arguments
on both  sides  that  need to  be  addressed,  the  situation  regarding  cancelability  then  provides  some
support for infallibilist pragmatic invariantism.
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